![]() ![]() You can do this by adding the appropriate mapping string to a users altSecurityIdentities attribute in Active Directory. If customers cannot reissue certificates with the new SID extension, we recommend that you create a manual mapping by using one of the strong mappings described above. Therefore, all mapping types based on usernames and email addresses are considered Address In general, mapping types are considered strong if they are based on identifiers that you cannot reuse. There are six supported values for this attribute, with three mappings considered weak (insecure) and the other three considered strong. See to learn more.ĭomain administrators can manually map certificates to a user in Active Directory using the altSecurityIdentities attribute of the users Object. ![]() As a result, the request involving the certificate failed. The Key Distribution Center (KDC) encountered a user certificate that was valid but contained a different SID than the user to which it mapped. The SID contained in the new extension of the users certificate does not match the users SID, implying that the certificate was issued to another user.Ĥ9 (For Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 and Windows Server 2008 SP2) ![]() The Windows update adds the following event logs. In this mode, if a certificate fails the strong (secure) mapping criteria (see Certificate mappings), authentication will be denied. By February 11, 2025, all devices will be updated to Full Enforcement mode. If no audit event logs are created on domain controllers for one month after installing the update, proceed with enabling Full Enforcement mode on all domain controllers. The update will provide audit events that identify certificates that are not compatible with Full Enforcement mode. Update all servers that run Active Directory Certificate Services and Windows domain controllers that service certificate-based authentication with the update (see Compatibility mode). To protect your environment, complete the following steps for certificate-based authentication: Additionally, conflicts between User Principal Names (UPN) and sAMAccountName introduced other emulation (spoofing) vulnerabilities that we also address with this security update. This allowed related certificates to be emulated (spoofed) in various ways. Added information on Strong Mappings Default Changes under "Timeline for Windows Updates"Ĭhanged Full Enforcement Mode date from Novemto Febru(these dates were previously listed as to November 14, 2023).Ĭhanged removal of Disabled mode from Februto April 11, 2023ĬVE-2022-34691, CVE-2022-26931 and CVE-2022-26923 address an elevation of privilege vulnerability that can occur when the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) is servicing a certificate-based authentication request. Before the security update, certificate-based authentication would not account for a dollar sign ($) at the end of a machine name. ![]()
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